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Abstract
In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine the optimal contract for a brand
name collaboration where the contract consists of xed-fee and output royalty. We
show that the rms always have the incentive for brand name collaboration. However,
whether the optimal contract will have positive xed-fee and positive royalty is not
immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting
and the consumersinitial perception about the products of the rms reected in the
consumersmaximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows that
the possibility of brand name collaboration is signicantly more than predicted in the
existing literature.
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1 Introduction
Many rms from developed countries are making collaborative agreements with the rms
from developing countries in recent years. The collaborative agreements not only involve
transfers of superior technologies, there are many instances when the developed-country
rms allow the developing country rms to use their brand names, which may create a
positive marketing e¤ect as documented in Sullivan (1998). While there is a vast literature
considering collaborative agreement involving production technologies,1 the issue of brand
name collaborartion, although empirically relevant, did not get much attention in the liter-
ature. As an example of brand name collaboration, lets consider the case of Ford-Otosan,
formerly known as Otosan Otomobil Sanayii based in Istanbul. In 2008, Ford, the Amer-
ican automobile company, which is one of the biggest commercial vehicle manufacturers
and exporters in Turkey conferred its brand name to Otosan. After the collaborative deal
between the two companies its products are simply branded as Ford-Otosan and the rev-
enue of the Otosan automobile company grew up reasonably. This may be because Ford
made the products more appealing to the customers because of its brand name. Marjit et
al. (2007) provide several examples of brand name collaboration. Aaker and Keller (1990)
and Tauber (1988) on brand extensions reveal that co-branding arrangements forms posi-
tive consumer perceptions about a particular brand. In a report on Swedish rms in India,
Paulsson (1986) found that the competitive rm licenses its brand name in order to exploit
export opportunities.
To the best of our knowledge, Marjit et al. (2007) is the only paper that shows the
protability of a brand name collaboration under a xed payment. It is needless to say that
the total benets from collaborative agreements involve benets from technology transfers
as well as from brand name collaborations. However, as correctly pointed out by Marjit
et al. (2007), while these e¤ects may be di¢ cult to separate empirically, one must try to
understand their theoretical implications. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this paper is
to determine the optimal brand name collaboration agreement between a developed-country
rm and a developing-country rm when the developed-country rm posses a superior brand
name than its developing-country counterpart.
We consider an international Cournot duopoly model where a developed-country rm
and a developing-country rm compete in the developing country with homogeneous prod-
ucts. The developed-country rm posses a superior brand name and needs to incur a per-unit
transportation cost of exporting. The developed-country rm can transfer its brand name
to the developing-country rm against an up-front xed-fee and a per-unit output royalty.
In order to focus on the brand name collaboration only, we assume away any technology dif-
ference across the rms. We show that the developed-country rm always has the incentive
to transfer its brand name to the developing-country rm. However, whether the optimal
contract will have positive xed-fee and positive royalty is not immediate and it depends on
the factors such as the transportation cost of exporting and the consumersinitial perception
about the products of the developed-country rm and the developing-country rm reected
in the consumersmaximum willingness to pay for the products.
Our analysis di¤ers from Marjit et al. (2007) in some important ways. Unlike them, we
consider a more general collaborative agreement involving both a xed payment and a royalty
payment depending on the output. We show how the optimal collaborative agreement
depends on the transportation cost of exporting and the consumers initial di¤erence in
the maximum willingness to pay. While Marjit et al. (2007), considering brand name
collaboration under a xed-fee only, show that it occurs between similarly reputed rms,
our analysis, considering both xed-fee and output royalty, shows that it occurs under any
feasible di¤erence in the reputation. Thus, we show that the possibility of brand name
1See Rostoker (1984), Kamien (1992) and Mukherjee (2009) for surveys on technology licensing.
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collaboration is signicantly higher than predicted by Marjit et al. (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Assume that there is a developed country and a developing country. There is a rm in each
country. Assume that rm 1 is in the developed country and rm 2 is in the developing
country. These rms produce homogeneous products. We assume that the rms compete
in the developing country like Cournot duopolists. Assume that the inverse market demand
functions faced by rms 1 and 2 are respectively:
P1 = a1   q1   q2
P2 = a2   q1   q2;
where a1 > a2 > 0. As in Marjit et al. (2007), the di¤erence in the consumersmaximum
willingness to pay for the products of rms 1 and 2 is due to di¤erent reputation of these
rms. We assume that the consumers perceive the product of rm 1 better than rm 2 and
it is reected in a higher maximum willingness to pay for the product of rm 1 than for the
product of rm 2. Hence, rm 1 has a more reputed brand name than rm 2.
In order to show the e¤ects of brand name collaboration, we assume away any di¤erence
in the cost of production. For simplicity, we assume that the constant marginal costs of
production are zero. However, we assume that rm 1 needs to incur a per-unit transportation
cost of exporting, t( 0).
The timing of the game is as follows. At stage 1, rm 1 o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it
collaborative agreement to rm 2 consisting of an up-front xed-fee (F > 0) and a per-unit
output royalty (r > 0). Firm 2 accepts the o¤er if it is not worse o¤ by accepting the
o¤er than rejecting the o¤er. At stage 2, the rms produce like Cournot duopolists and the
prots are realised. We solve the game through backward induction.
3 The results
Let us rst consider the situation under no collaborative agreement, which provides the
reservation payo¤s of the rms. Under no collaborative agreement, rms 1 and 2 maximise
the following expressions:
Max
q1
(a1   q1   q2   t) q1 (1)
Max
q2
(a2   q1   q2) q2: (2)
Straightforward calculations show that the equilibrium outputs as
qnl1 =
1
3
(2a1   a2   2t) (3)
qnl2 =
1
3
(2a2   a1 + t) : (4)
It is immediate that both rms produce positive outputs under no collaboration for any
t if t < 2a1 a22 and 2a2 > a1. We assume that it holds.
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The respective payo¤s are:
nc1 =
1
9
(2a1   a2   2t)2 and nc2 =
1
9
(2a2   a1 + t)2 : (5)
We now consider the case under collaborative agreement where rm 1 allows rm 2 to
use its brand name and charges a non-negative up-front xed-fee, F , and a per-unit non-
negative output royalty, r. Under the collaborative agreement, rms 1 and 2 determine the
respective outputs to maximise the following expressions:
Max
q1
(a1   q1   q2   t) q1 + rq2 + F (6)
Max
q2
(a1   q1   q2   r) q2   F: (7)
The equilibrium outputs are qc1 =
1
3 (a1   2t+ r) and qc2 = 13 (a1   2r + t). The equi-
librium outputs are positive if 2r   a1 < t < a1+r2 . The respective prots are c1 =
1
9 (a1 + r   2t)2 + r3 (a1   2r + t) + F and c2 = 19 (a1   2r + t)2   F . Firm 1 maximises
the following expression to determine F and r:
Max
F;r
c1 =
1
9
(a1 + r   2t)2 + r
3
(a1   2r + t) + F (8)
subject to
1
9
(a1 + r   2t)2 + r
3
(a1   2r + t) + F > 1
9
(2a1   a2   2t)2 (9)
1
9
(a1   2r + t)2   F > 1
9
(2a2   a1 + t)2 (10)
F; r > 0 and qc1; qc2 > 0: (11)
The constraints (9) and (10) show the participation constraints of rms 1 and 2 respectively.
Condition (11) shows the non-negativity constraints for F , r and the outputs.
Since rm 1 o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to rm 2, the optimal up-front xed fee
must satisfy
F  =
1
9
(a1   2r + t)2   1
9
(2a2   a1 + t)2 : (12)
Hence, rm 1s maximisation problem (eq. 8) reduces to the following
Max
r
c;t1 =
1
9
(a1 + r   2t)2+ r
3
(a1   2r + t)+ 1
9
(a1   2r + t)2  1
9
(2a2   a1 + t)2 ; (13)
subject to the non-negativity constraints.
Ignoring the non-negativity constraints on r, we get the optimal per-unit output royalty
as r = 12 (a1   5t). If t > a15 , the non-negativity constraint implies that the optimal royalty
is zero. The corresponding equilibrium up-front xed fee is F  = 49 (a2 + t) (a1   a2).
If t < a15 , the equilibrium royalty is r
 = 12 (a1   5t), which satises the constraint
for positive outputs, i.e., 2r   a1 < t < a1+r2 . The corresponding equilibrium xed-fee is
F  = 19 (2a2   a1 + 7t) (a1   2a2 + 5t). Given our assumption of 2a2 > a1 (which is required
for the positive output of rm 2 under no collaboration for any t), F  > 0 for t > 2a2 a15 .
Hence, the equilibrium contract consists of F  > 0 and r > 0 for 2a2 a15 < t <
a1
5 .
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If t 6 2a2 a15 , we get that F  = 0, implying that the collaborative agreement consists of
only output royalty for t < 2a2 a15 . The equilibrium output royalty in this situation follows
from rm 2s participation constraint and is r = (a1   a2).
It is easy to check that while the above contracts make rm 2 indi¤erent between col-
laboration and no collaboration, rm 1 is always better o¤ under collaboration compared
with no collaboration, suggesting that brand name collaboration always occurs if rm 1 can
choose the up-front xed-fee and the output royalty.
We summarise the above discussion in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Brand name collaboration agreement always takes place between rms 1 and
2. The equilibrium collaborative agreements are:
(a) When 0 6 t 6 2a2 a15 , the equilibrium xed-fee is zero and the equilibrium royalty is
r = (a1   a2).
(b) When 2a2 a15 < t <
a1
5 , the equilibrium contract consists of F
 = 19 (2a2   a1 + 7t)
(a1   2a2 + 5t) and r = a1 5t2 .
(c) When a15 6 t <
2a1 a2
2 , the equilibrium xed-fee is F
 = 49 (a2 + t) (a1   a2) and the
equilibrium royalty is zero.
The reason for the above proposition is as follows. There are two motives for brand name
collaboration. On the one hand, it tends to increase the industry prot by increasing the
consumersmaximum willingness to pay for rm 2s product. On the other hand, it tends
to increase the industry prot by increasing the output of rm 2 and reducing the output
of rm 1, thus saving the transportation cost. Firm 1 can extract the benet from brand
name collaboration through xed-fee and output royalty. The output royalty also helps to
soften competition ex-post collaboration by increasing rms marginal cost.
If the transportation cost is very small, the competition softening e¤ect of royalty be-
comes the dominant factor and rm 1 charges the royalty rate in a way so that the market
shares of the rms remain the same under collaboration and no collaboration. Hence, in
this situation, the equilibrium xed-fee is zero. On the other hand, if the transportation
cost is su¢ ciently high, rm 1s market share is small, and the transportation cost saving
motive encourages rm 1 to increase rm 2s benet from collaboration as high as possible.
In this situation, rm 1 does not have any incentive to distort rm 2s output choice by
imposing a positive output royalty. Hence, rm 1 charges only positive xed-fee and zero
royalty for su¢ ciently high transportation cost. For intermediate transportation cost, both
the competition softening e¤ect and the transportation cost saving e¤ect are important and
rm 1 prefers to charge positive xed-fee and positive output royalty.
Although the implications of a positive transportation cost and output royalty follow
from the above result, it may worth highlighting them here. It follows from Proposition
1(a) that if there is no transportation cost, as considered in Marjit et al. (2007), rm 1
charges only a positive royalty. Hence, unless there are other reasons, such as imitation or the
problem of verying outputs of rm 2, the xed-fee contract considered in Marjit et al. (2007)
is not justiable in this situaiton. The xed-fee contract considered in Marjit et al. (2007)
may not justiable even for non-zero but low transportation cost (see Propositions 1(a) and
1(b)). However, if the transportation cost is high, as in Proposition 1(c), rm 1 charges only
an up-front xed-fee. This situaiton justies the xed-fee contarct considered in Marjit et
al. (2007), even if there is no imitation and the outputs of rm 2 are veriable. Thus, we
show that the value of the transportation cost plays an important role in determining the
optimal collaborative agreement.
The above analysis also suggests that the presence of output royalty ensures that brand
name collaboration occurs always, which is in contrast to Marjit et al. (2007). Marjit et
al. (2007) considered only xed-fee, and therefore, ignored the competition softening e¤ect
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of output royalty. Hence, brand name collaboration was not protable in their analysis if
the brand names of rms 1 and 2 were su¢ ciently di¤erent, since brand name collaboration
would expose rm 1 to a erce competition from rm 2. However, the use of an output
royalty in our analysis allows rm 1 to control the intensity of competition by a¤ecting rm
2s marginal cost. In fact, rm 1 can always keep the same intensity of competition after
brand name collaboration to that of before brand name collaboration by charging an output
royalty equal to (a1 a2). This competition softening e¤ect of royalty creates the possibility
of a protable collaboration always in our analysis.
Like the existing literature (Marjit et al., 2007), we conduct our analysis under the
assumption that the antritrust law prevents collusive agreement between the rms. The
anti-competitive nature of the collusive agreement may induce the antirust authority to
prevent collusion between the rms. The non-negativity constraints on the xed-fee and
output royalty considered in our analysis reect this restriction. For example, if we ignore
transportation cost and also ignore the non-negativity constraint on the xed-fee and output
royalty, the equilibrium royalty rate is r = a12 . It is easy to check that this royalty rate
allows rm 1 to produce like a monopolist and rm 1 can satisfy rm 2s participation
constraint by paying rm 2 its reservation payo¤. However, the non-negativity constraint
on the xed-fee, due to the antitrust law, prevents rm 1 from charging so high royalty.
We assume that the antitrust law is also responsible for preventing merger between the
rms. Moreover, merger agreements often involve signicant costs due to organizational,
managerial and technological reasons (see, e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990 and Beladi et al.
2009) and these costs associated with merger may make merger as an unprotable option.
If we follow this line of justication, it is then implicit in our analysis that the cost of brand
name transfer is lower than the cost of forming a merger. It is intuitive that if the rms
could merge, the rms could earn higher prots compared to the brand name collaboration
considered in this paper.
4 Conclusion
Although brand name collaboration is empirically relevant, the theoretical literature did
not pay much attention to this aspect. In an international Cournot duopoly, we determine
the optimal contract for a brand name collaboration where the contract consists of xed-fee
and output royalty. We show that the rms always have the incentive for brand name col-
laboration. However, whether the optimal contract will have positive xed-fee and positive
royalty is not immediate and it depends on the factors such as the transportation cost of
exporting and the consumers initial perception about the products of the rms reected
in the consumersmaximum willingness to pay for the products. Thus, our paper shows
that the possibility of brand name collaboration is signicantly more than predicted in the
existing literature.
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